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ARTICLE
MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE FOUNDATION OF LAW
Jeffrey C. Tuomala†
I. INTRODUCTION
Marbury v. Madison enjoys pride of place among United States Supreme
Court decisions.1 The National Archives has placed it as the only Supreme
Court case on display in the company of the Declaration of Independence
and the United States Constitution.2 Marbury is the first case that most
American law students study in their introductory course on constitutional
law.
It is not hard to imagine why the Marbury opinion accompanies the
Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury established
the principle that the Constitution is law that courts are to interpret and to
apply in cases and controversies before them, and that the Constitution is in
fact “fundamental and paramount law.”3 It is also in Marbury that the Chief
Justice charged the reader to remember that the “government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men.”4
As scholars often miss the importance of the relationship of the
Constitution to the Declaration of Independence as organic law, it is not
surprising that they miss the relationship of Marbury to the Declaration as
well. This is quite remarkable considering the fact that the Declaration not
only serves as the articles of incorporation of the United States of America,
but also articulates the jurisprudence upon which Marshall based the
doctrine of judicial review. The Declaration of Independence explains the
origin and relationship of the right and will of the people to declare their
† Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law,
Liberty University School of Law. The author is indebted to Dean Herbert W. Titus for
numerous insights into Chief Justice John Marshall’s jurisprudence and the relationship
between the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION, at ix-x (2009). The original
Marbury decision appears alongside the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and
the Bill of Rights at the National Archives in the “Charters of Freedom” hall. Id. Marbury is
also featured in the National Archives online version of the “Charters of Freedom.”
Archives.gov, Charters of Freedom, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/charters_of_
freedom_8.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
3. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
4. Id. at 163.
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existence as an independent nation-state and to establish a form of
government they believe is best designed to secure their God-given rights.5
The main purpose for which Marbury is studied is that it unequivocally
established the rule that courts have the power to review the
constitutionality of certain executive and legislative acts. Since most
students know, even before entering law school, that courts possess the
power of judicial review, one would assume that law professors teach
Marbury in order to firmly ground the exercise of that power. And even if
professors do not believe that Marshall’s opinion provides firm ground, one
would expect professors to encourage students to carefully consider the
main reason that Marshall expressly gave for concluding that the
Constitution is paramount law. Although an observer cannot necessarily
discern the focus of class discussions by surveying the content of
Constitutional Law casebooks or of teacher’s manuals that accompany
those casebooks, one might reasonably conclude that Marshall’s express
rationale is generally not carefully considered.6
5. Id. at 176.
6. Some of the most prominent constitutional law textbooks fail to note that Marshall
used language in Marbury that mirrors language found in the Declaration of Independence.
These textbooks also fail to include any discussion on whether law-of-nature jurisprudence
influenced Marshall’s concept of judicial review in Marbury. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES IN CONTEXT (2008); JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS DIENES,
WAYNE MCCORMACK & MARTIN H. REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY,
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2006); PAUL BREST, SANDFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN,
AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2006); DAVID CRUMP, EUGENE GRESSMAN, DAVID S. DAY
& CHARLES W. “ROCKY” RHODES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed.
2009); DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY
(4th ed., Thomson Reuters 2009) (1993); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, STEPHEN B. PRESSER, JON C.
EASTMAN & RAYMOND B. MARCIN, THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 2009); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed., Thomson West 2004) (1978); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN
ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2008); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (9th ed., Thomson Reuters
2009) (1981); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005); KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (15th ed. 2004) (1937); JONATHAN D.
VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed., Thomson
Reuters/Foundation Press 2009) (1959); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, STEVEN I. FREIDLAND,
CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONALD E. LIVELY & WENDY B. SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (2006). Dean Sullivan’s textbook includes a thoughtful
discussion of the “historical antecedents” of the theory of judicial review. SULLIVAN &
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The doctrine of judicial review is not the only doctrine set out in
Marbury that Marshall grounded in the jurisprudence of the Declaration of
Independence. Marshall referred to the “general principles of law” that,
along with acts of Congress, bind the courts.7 It is most reasonable to
conclude that these general principles can be traced to the same source as
the “general principles of commercial law” upon which Justice Joseph
Story based his opinion in Swift v. Tyson.8 It is widely acknowledged that
Story believed that “general principles of commercial law” are found in the
law of nature and that those principles bind all courts and provide them
with rules of decision.9 While Swift is completely discredited or even
entirely ignored today, the holding (if not the rationale) in Marbury is still
honored.
The issue to which Marshall devoted the most attention in Marbury was
that of distinguishing between matters that are purely political in nature and
those that are suitable for adjudication.10 Actions of executive officers that

GUNTHER, supra, at 15-17. Although she notes that Marshall’s theory of judicial review
might be a product of the “the spread of general ideas [in the 1780s] conducive to the
acceptance of judicial review”—such as “the view that the will of the people as expressed in
a constitution was superior to any legislative enactment”—she, like many of her
contemporaries, fails to note the relationship between the words chosen by Marshall in
Marbury and the Declaration of Independence. Id. at 15 (citing BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); William R. Casto, James Iredell
and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995)). In addition,
Sullivan labels as a “remote and tangential byway[]” the suggestion that judicial review is
grounded in Lord Coke’s notion that “the common law will controul acts of parliament,
[and] adjudge them to be utterly void when the acts are against common right and reason.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps modern scholars fail to see that Marshall
rooted his theory of judicial review on the law-of-nature jurisprudential principles contained
in the Declaration of Independence because they are blinded by an “evolutionary” view of
the law as “a repository of shifting social values,” and they reject the idea of law as a “set of
universal principles.” Herbert W. Titus, Moses, Blackstone and the Law of the Land,
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y Q., Fall 1980, at 5, 7 (citing FRED. V. CAHILL, JR., JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 22-23 (1952); G. Edward White,
Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary Debate and the ‘Lessons’
of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 171 (1979)).
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
8. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 18, 22 (1842).
9. Id.
10. Justice Marshall asked,
Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be considered as a mere
political act, belonging to the executive department alone, for the performance
of which, entire confidence is placed by our constitution in the supreme
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are political in nature, and that are therefore matters of discretion, are not
subject to judicial review.11 However, when acts of Congress prescribe or
circumscribe actions of executive branch officers with a certain degree of
particularity, they often create positive legal rights in individuals that may
be remedied in courts of law.12 The ground for the distinction and
relationship between the political and judicial is also found in the
Declaration of Independence. It is the law of nature and nature’s God.13
The dispute in Marbury, whether the plaintiff was entitled to delivery of
his commission as justice of the peace, may not be especially momentous,
but Marshall’s opinion is particularly instructive for teaching the
foundational principles of jurisprudence.14 The “laws of nature and nature’s
God” provide the grounding for three basic legal doctrines: judicial review,
general principles of law, and the distinction between political and judicial
powers.15 These three doctrines are central to Marshall’s opinion. The
failure to engage the law-of-nature jurisprudential basis for the doctrines of
judicial review, general principles of law, and the distinction between
political and judicial powers represents a willful blindness to, or deliberate
executive; and for any misconduct respecting which, the injured individual has
no remedy?
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id.
13. There is no reason to give the “law of nature” as used in the Declaration of
Independence a different meaning than that which Blackstone gave it—the “will of [man’s]
maker is called the law of nature.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39. In other
words, “the law of nature” is not something that inheres in nature that is independent of and
equally ultimate to God. Blackstone believed that the law of nature has universal
applicability and is superior to all positive law: “This law of nature, being co-eval with
mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other.” Id. at
*41. Blackstone also defined three other categories of law—natural law, revealed law, and
human law. Revealed law, or that which is revealed in Scripture, is the law of nature
“expressly declared so to be by God . . . .” Id. at *42. The natural law, in distinction, is that
which mankind “in it’s [sic] present corrupted state” only “imagine[s]” the law of nature to
be through the “assistance of human reason.” Id. Therefore, the revealed law is “of infinitely
more authority than what we generally call the natural law.” Id. All human laws, explained
Blackstone, depend “[u]pon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation,” rather than upon the natural law. Id. It is very interesting to note that Blackstone
believed that God has so intertwined the happiness of man with obedience to the law of
nature, that the law of nature might be reduced to one maxim—“that man should pursue his
own happiness.” Id. at *41. When the Declaration declares the “unalienable” right of the
“pursuit of happiness,” it is in effect equating that right with the positive duty to obey the
law of God. Neither Blackstone nor the Declaration promotes utilitarianism.
14. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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shunning of, a jurisprudence that contemporary jurists and writers find
unacceptable or even contemptible.16 Yet these jurists and writers continue
to cite Marbury because they are eager to find validation for their own
conclusions in matters of constitutional interpretation.17
II. BACKGROUND TO MARBURY V. MADISON
The basic facts of Marbury are familiar to most lawyers and law students
and are easily summarized. In the waning days of his administration,
President John Adams appointed William Marbury to serve as a Justice of
the Peace for the County of Washington of the District of Columbia, an
office created under the Judiciary Act of 1789.18 Adams signed Marbury’s
commission, and Secretary of State John Marshall affixed the seal of the
United States to it but failed to deliver it to Marbury before Adams’
successor, Thomas Jefferson, took office.19 Jefferson’s Secretary of State,
James Madison, refused to deliver the commission, so Marbury filed a
lawsuit against Madison in the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus
ordering Madison to deliver the commission.20 Madison failed to answer
Marbury’s complaint, failed to respond to an order to show cause issued
from the Court explaining why judgment should not issue against him, and
16. The influence of modern epistemology on the modern legal tradition may account
for the dismissal or outright opposition that contemporary scholars display toward the lawof-nature jurisprudence upon which Marshall based his theory of judicial review. “Modernist
epistemology,” according to G. Edward White, gave rise to new schools of judicial
philosophy in the twentieth century, such as Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism.
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN
JUDGES, at xi (3d ed. 2007). White explains, “Modernist epistemology replaced the external
causal agents of a premodern worldview—God, nature, the cycles of history, stratified social
roles, the ‘iron laws’ of political economy, and the ‘law’ as a collection of immanent and
timeless principles—with human will and power.” Id. Furthermore, the acceptance of
modern epistemology among legal scholars caused them to reject the “oracular theory of
judging” practiced by John Marshall—“understanding of judicial decision-making . . . as an
exercise in ‘finding’ rather than ‘making’ law, with ‘law’ being conceived as a body of finite
and immutable principles . . . .” Id. at viii-ix, 125.
17. Scholar Fred V. Cahill explains that the legal theorist has a tendency to justify his
theory of “judicial legislation” by “tak[ing] account of . . . [previous] developments and . . .
mak[ing] his theory of law congruous with them.” See CAHILL, supra note 6, at 21. Although
the law-of-nature jurisprudence on which Marshall based his theory of judicial review in
Marbury is foreign to most contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation, perhaps
the tendency of contemporary legal scholars to invoke Marbury as a means to support their
theories is an example of the phenomenon described by Cahill.
18. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 155.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 154-55.
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failed to appear at trial, either personally or through counsel. The Court
proceeded to trial in Madison’s absence.21
Marshall identified three issues in Marbury. First, did Marbury have a
legal right to possession of the commission?22 Second, even if he had a
legal right to the commission, did the law provide him with a remedy?23
Finally, did the Court have jurisdiction to afford the remedy of
mandamus?24 Marshall structured his opinion to address each of these three
issues in the order listed.25
The Court found that Marbury had a legal right to the commission,
because the law only required that it be signed to perfect his appointment.26
Affixing the seal provided proof that it was the President’s signature and
that the appointment had therefore been perfected.27 Delivery was not a
condition or element of the appointment.28 The appointment having been
perfected, Madison had a duty to deliver the commission evidencing the
appointment to Marbury.29 This conclusion was based on the general
principle of law that where there is a legal duty, there must be a legal
remedy.30 Courts therefore may order executive officers to perform duties
that have been made obligatory by law; such duties are no longer matters of
executive discretion.31
Few commentators fail to note that courts normally address jurisdictional
issues first, and that if a court finds it has no jurisdiction, it does not address
the merits of the case.32 Marshall did not follow that order and instead
addressed the jurisdictional issue last, concluding the Court had no
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Incidentally, the issues in Marbury reflect the three essential components of a
complaint filed in federal court—a cause of action, a demand for remedy, and a statement of
the basis upon which it is alleged that the court has jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
26. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168.
27. Id. at 167-68.
28. Id. at 160.
29. Id. at 159.
30. Id. at 166. Marshall explained, “But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the
individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy.” Id.
31. Id. at 162.
32. For example, Professor Massey asks whether Marshall’s approach to the issues in
Marbury constitutes “[p]olitical [g]uile” because the Chief Justice decided the jurisdictional
issue last. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 14
(3d ed. 2009).
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jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus.33 The basic conflict, as Marshall
framed it, between the statute in issue and the Constitution was that the
statute purported to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in this type
of case, but Article III of the Constitution limits original jurisdiction to two
categories of cases.34 Marbury’s case did not fall into either of these two
categories—“Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . and those in which a State
shall be Party.”35 Marshall concluded that because the Constitution is
superior to statutory law, any act of Congress that conflicts with the
Constitution is not law.36 Although Marbury may have had a right to the
commission, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus because the statute purporting to give jurisdiction conflicted
with the Constitution.37 In so ruling, Marshall unequivocally established
what has become generally referred to as the power of judicial review.
III. MARBURY—THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Modern positivists, be they liberal, conservative, or something else,
believe that the Constitution is law.38 They also generally believe that the
Constitution, either as written in 1787 or as rewritten in the consciences of
the People and revealed through Supreme Court decisions over the past 200
years, is superior to acts of Congress. On the other hand, they usually treat
the Declaration of Independence and the theories of law and government
found in it as statements of political rhetoric with little or no juridical

33. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154, 168, 176, 180.
34. Id. at 173-74.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 177, 180.
37. Id. at 176, 180.
38. Legal positivists believe that positive laws—judicial norms established by the
state—are the only laws. See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY
AND METHOD OF LAW 97, 296 (4th ed. 1981).
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relevance.39 As a result, they miss the presupposition upon which Marshall
based his opinion in Marbury.40
Marshall began his exposition of the power of judicial review by
drawing a distinction between the people’s original and supreme right and
their original and supreme will in establishing a form of government.41 The
people of the United States have the right to establish a form of
government, and through an act of their collective will they exercised that
right by organizing a government and assigning powers to various
departments within it.42 In essence, the people, possessing the supreme lawmaking power, exercised that power by adopting a written constitution that
took effect in 1789.43 Because the people exercised their legislative will in
accordance with their right to do so, the Constitution of the United States is,
by nature, law.44
The Constitution delegates limited and defined powers to the national
government and provides for the election or appointment of officers to
exercise those powers.45 To Congress, the people delegated the power to
make laws that are limited to those objects enumerated in the
39. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Declaration Is Not Law, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y
Q., Fall 1991, at 8 (arguing that the Declaration of Independence is part political philosophy,
part “political propaganda from another age, with more power to embarrass than to inspire,”
but no part “is law unless enacted into law”). But see Herb Titus, The Declaration Legally
Established a New Nation, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y Q., Fall 1991, at 6-8 (arguing that the
Declaration was a legal document written in the name of the people of the colonies that
made a legal case establishing a new nation based on the laws of nature and nature’s God).
40. Some of the most prominent constitutional law textbooks fail to note that Marshall
used language in Marbury that mirrors language found in the Declaration of Independence.
See supra note 6.
41. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
42. Id. Jesus Christ created all “thrones,” “powers,” “rulers,” and “authorities,”
including civil authorities, for Himself. Colossians 1:16 (New International Version) (all
Bible references made hereinafter are from the New International Version); Romans 13:1.
And all authorities, including civil authorities, are subject to him. Ephesians 1:18-23. The
people, however, have a role to play, as secondary causal agents, in establishing particular
forms of government. This was true even of ancient Israel. A monarchy was not forced on
Israel. The people, through a congress of elders, insisted that they have a king “such as all
the other nations have.” 1 Samuel 8:1-5. The people of Israel also enthusiastically affirmed
Saul as King; he was not forced on them. 1 Samuel 10:24. Israel even had a written
constitution for the regulation of its government. 1 Samuel 10:25. The king, however, was
not to govern as kings of the other nations did. He was not only under God, he was under
law. In fact, Moses had in advance written laws specifically for the regulation of the
kingship. See Deuteronomy 17.
43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Constitution.46 Acts of Congress and provisions of the Constitution are laws
that bind the courts.47 But when there is a conflict between a provision of
the Constitution and an act of Congress, the courts must treat the enactment
as void, for in reality it is not law.48
Congress, as an agent of the people, has the power to make laws because
the people, who are the principal possessing the supreme legislative power,
have delegated a portion of that power to Congress through the
Constitution. Congress must act within the scope of its delegated powers,
because an agent has no greater power than what the principal gives the
agent.49
To the courts, the people have delegated the judicial power. The exercise
of the judicial power entails the interpretation of the law and its application
in particular cases. When there is a conflict between the Constitution and
acts of Congress, judges must apply the Constitution as paramount law.50
What then is the source of the people’s original right to exercise the
original will, which is necessary for the adoption of a Constitution?
Although Marbury did not expressly cite the Declaration of Independence,
it is clear from the language Marshall used that he was referring to that
document and the principles it sets out. The Declaration of Independence is
the instrument by which the people of the United States announced that
they were a people separate from the English people, and it served as the
articles of incorporation for a new nation-state—the United States of
America. That founding document also lays out the jurisprudential
principles Marshall presupposed in writing his opinion in Marbury.51
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 178.
49. Jesus Christ reinforced the fact that Christian rulers are not to be rulers like those of
all the other nations. They are not to lord their authority over the people, but rather are to be
servants of the people. Even today, we refer to civil rulers as public servants, though they
may not act like servants.
Jesus called them together and said, “You know that the rulers of the Gentiles
lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them. Not so
with you. Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your
servant, and whoever wants to be first must be your slave—just as the Son of
Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for
many.”
Matthew 20:25-28.
50. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
51. A number of scholars recognize that Marshall invoked the principles of the
Declaration of Independence in Marbury. Lewis E. Lehrman explains:
In [the Marbury] opinion, often cited by both judicial supremacists and legal
positivists who reject natural law, Marshall considers “the question, whether an
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Whereas the Declaration serves as the articles of incorporation, the
Constitution serves as the bylaws of the United States of America.52 It is a
generally recognized principle of corporate law that bylaws must be read in
light of their corresponding articles of incorporation.53 A nation-state is a
corporate body.

act, repugnant to the Constitution, can become the law of the land. It seems
only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and
well established, to decide it.” And by what principle shall it be decided? To
which Marshall had an unequivocal answer: “That the people have an original
right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the
whole American fabric is erected.” “The principles, therefore, so established,
are deemed fundamental.” But why or how is Marshall so absolutely sure of
“the basis” and “the principles” deemed fundamental to the Constitution—to
the “whole American fabric?” Because, in fact, Marshall draws the very words
of this part of his opinion almost exactly from the Declaration of Independence
itself—from the second paragraph, which reads “it is the right of the people . . .
to institute new government laying its foundation on such principles . . . as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”
Lewis E. Lehrman, On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 343, 348 (1987) (footnotes omitted); see also Richard J. Doughtery, Originalism and
Precedent: Principles and Practices in the Application of Stare Decisis, 6 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 155, 184-85 (2007); Wilson Huhn, Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing
Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813, 847-48 (2002); Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the
Original Intentions of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 351, 435 (1987) (“The resemblance of the language of the Declaration and
that of Marbury can no more be coincidental than the resemblance of the language of the
Declaration to certain passages in Locke’s Second Treatise.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2712 (2003) (“In a sense, the
premises of the Declaration of Independence thus parallel the premises of judicial review,
and one can hear distinct echoes of American revolutionary thought in the opening lines of
Marshall’s argument in Marbury . . . .”).
52. The author is indebted to Herbert W. Titus, founding dean of the Regent University
School of Law, for this understanding of the relationship between the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Titus traces his understanding to a conversation that
he had with John Brabner-Smith at a Christian Legal Society Conference in the fall of 1977.
Brabner-Smith served as founding dean of the International School of Law, which
eventually became the George Mason School of Law.
53. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06 (2002) (“The bylaws of a corporation may
contain any provision for managing the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation
that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation.”); see also Scotts African
Union Methodist Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant
Church, 98 F.3d 78, 95 (3d Cir. 1996) (“provisions of a corporation’s charter or articles of
incorporation enjoy priority over contradictory or inconsistent by-laws.”); Associated
Grocers of Ala. v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990, 995-96 (N.D. Ala. 1948) (“By-laws are
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Marshall wrote in Marbury: “That the people have an original right to
establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion,
shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected.”54 It is obvious that Marshall adopted
this principle, and even borrowed language, from the Declaration of
Independence, which states: “[I]t is the Right of the People . . . to institute
[a] new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness.”55
What then is the source of this original right? Is it something that is
inherent to human nature? Is it the grant of a superior earthly sovereign? Is
it something that the people as political sovereign simply posit? The answer
is, “None of these!” The right of any people to establish their own civil
government originates in the law of God, the lawgiver, and it is to Him that
they are responsible. The people of the United States claimed it was the
“Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” that entitled them to declare
independence and establish their own form of government.56 The people
made these claims of original right on July 4, 1776, when they announced
to the world that they had “assume[d] among the powers of the earth the
separate and equal station” of an independent and sovereign nation.57 In
Marbury, Marshall presupposed that there is a fundamental law as
summarized in the Declaration of Independence that governs the affairs of
men and nations in their formation, in their internal governance, and in their
relations with other nations.
That preexisting law provides the right to exercise the political will to
declare independence, to adopt a constitution, and to delegate to Congress
the power to enact positive laws that comply with the law of God. It is on
the basis of this fundamental legal right that Marshall wrote: “This original
and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different
departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish
certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government
of the United States is of the latter description.”58 This also is a reference to
the language of the Declaration of Independence quoted above—“to
valid only when consistent with the charter and those by-laws which are not consistent with
the charter but are in conflict with and repugnant to it are void.”).
54. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added).
55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added); see
sources cited supra note 51.
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
57. Id.
58. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
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institute [a] new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form”—and reinforces the fact that will must
be exercised in conformity with right.59 The Declaration makes a further
connection between the law of God and the right to delegate the powers of
civil government. It states that the purpose of civil government is to secure
“certain unalienable rights” with which men “are endowed by their
Creator,”60 and that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it.”61 The Constitution establishes a form of
government that the people structure in such a way as they believe will
most effectively secure preexisting, God-given rights.62
It is well-settled that the Constitution is law and that it is superior to acts
of Congress. Therefore, few within the legal profession believe that courts
have a duty to uphold legislative or executive acts that violate the
Constitution. The Constitution as law is superior to statutes because the
people as legislators are superior to Congress. Jurists therefore agree with
Marshall that “[c]ertainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that
an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”63
At the same time, many seem perplexed by the fact that Marshall did not
rely on the supremacy clause or any other text of the Constitution in ruling
that the courts have the power of judicial review. Marshall made reference
to several clauses in Articles I, III, and VI of the Constitution as providing
additional evidence that courts have the power of judicial review, but he did
not base his holding on textual arguments.64 For many it is equally
59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
60. All three persons of the Trinity were involved as one God in creating all things—
God the Father (Deuteronomy 32:6), God the Son (John 1:1-15), and God the Holy Spirit
(Genesis 1:2). The Gospel of John proclaims the Son’s role:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God. He was with God in the beginning.
Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has
been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light shines
in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it.
John 1:1-5.
61. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
62. Id. (“That to secure [unalienable rights], governments are instituted among
men . . . .”).
63. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
64. Id. at 178-80.

2010]

FOUNDATION OF LAW

309

perplexing that Marshall did not rely on any of the numerous cases that he
could have cited as precedent for invoking the power of judicial review.
Nor did Marshall make an appeal to original intent, though Alexander
Hamilton specifically addressed the question of judicial review in The
Federalist Papers.65 And Marshall did not base his argument on necessity,
custom, or evolving social norms.
Marshall relied instead on the political and legal theories embodied in
the Declaration of Independence, theories that had been worked out, fought
over, and died for during the course of several centuries, including the
eighteenth century in America.66 For any number of reasons, those theories
of law are unacceptable to most contemporary lawyers, judges, and
professors.67 As a result, jurists resist acknowledging the significance of the
references to the Declaration of Independence upon which Marshall based

65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. Contrary to the belief of Leon Skousen expressed in The 5000 Year Leap, liberty
was not rebirthed in 1787 in Constitution Hall, in Philadelphia after a 5,000 year hiatus.
LEON SKOUSEN, THE 5000 YEAR LEAP 1-6 (National Center for Constitutional Studies 2006)
(1981). Liberty was birthed in A.D. 0, in a manger in Bethlehem, and ever since that time
has been growing and will continue to grow until it fills the whole earth. See Daniel 2;
Matthew 13:31-33.
67. Law-of-nature jurisprudence is unacceptable to secular liberals and conservatives.
To both, any serious reference to civil law being based on the law of God is embarrassing
and threatening. On the one hand, the “liberal” has reason to fear that a law-of-nature
jurisprudence would mean the imposition of limits on the imagination in the creation of
rights. As G. Edward White explains, modern liberalism criticized and eventually discredited
the oracular theory of judicial decision-making—“understanding of judicial decision making
as the exercise of ‘finding’ rather than ‘making’ law, with ‘law’ being conceived as a body
of finite and immutable principles”—on account of the refusal of judges in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, generally employing the oracular theory, to
adapt to social change and reach legal results “that sustained affirmative governmental
action to alleviate economic and social inequalities,” as liberalism demanded. See WHITE,
supra note 16, at vii-ix, 129. On the other hand, the conservative fears a law-of-nature
jurisprudence because he believes it will give fuel to the imagination in conjuring up new
rights. Robert Bork’s attitude toward natural law reflects those fears:
The judge can have nothing to do with any absolute set of truths existing
independently and depending upon God or the nature of the universe. If a judge
should claim to have access to such a body of truths, to possess a volume of the
annotated natural law, we would, quite justifiably, suspect that the source of the
revelation was really no more exalted than the judge’s viscera.
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 30
(1971).
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the doctrine of judicial review, despite the fact they are unable to provide
any other explanation with which they are able to satisfy even themselves.68
It is common to refer to the process of striking an act of Congress that is
inconsistent with the Constitution as the power of judicial review, as though
it were a power severable from the power of interpreting and applying the
law in particular cases. Marshall’s position, however, was that judicial
review is part and parcel of the judicial power, because the essence of
judicial duty necessarily entails determining which of two conflicting rules
applies in a given case.69 It is, in part, a failure to reckon with the judicial
philosophy upon which Marbury is based that one could believe that the
Constitution is law but that legislators can bind courts to Congress’s
interpretation of the Constitution. Every officer of the United States and of
the several states is bound by oath to support the Constitution and must
therefore interpret that document in the performance of his or her duties.70
68. For the most part, commentators appear oblivious to the fact that Marshall’s opinion
in Marbury is based upon presuppositions of a law-of-nature jurisprudence, and, as a result,
they fail to recognize the importance of distinguishing frame-of-government issues from
general-principles-of-law issues when interpreting the Constitution. In short, they are
positivists who believe that law is essentially the command of the sovereign with courts
exercising a lawmaking function. For them, law is fundamentally and exclusively a product
of human will. The “triumph-of-the-will” jurisprudence of the legal positivists is the logical
conclusion of the legal revolution spawned by the concept of evolution that displaced the
jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. See CAHILL, supra note 17, at 22.
69. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.”). One of the problems that arises for the writers in
dealing with Marshall’s opinion is that they make a distinction between judicial power and
the power of judicial review, a distinction that Marshall did not make. This problem is
related at least in part to the issue of whether Congress or the courts are the ultimate
interpreter of the law. Clearly, it would seem that all three branches have a duty to interpret
the Constitution in order to perform their duties. The problem is further compounded by the
philosophy that courts make law. As a principle of utility it would then seem that one law
interpreter or the other must have the final say in the matter, and today the assumption is that
the courts are the ultimate law interpreters. This position has been bolstered by quoting only
the first of the following sentences from Marbury without quoting the other two: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” Id.
Although Marshall said that it is the province of the Court to interpret the law, the Court’s
power to authoritatively interpret extends only to the particular case before it. Marshall did
not say that it is the exclusive province of courts to interpret law that binds those who are not
parties, or that courts make law. For Marshall, the exercise of judicial power, among other
things, includes judging which law applies when laws conflict by applying the supreme law
in the case at hand. Id.
70. Id. at 180.
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Congress has a duty not to enact unconstitutional laws, and the courts,
pursuant to the judicial power delegated from the people, have a duty not to
enforce unconstitutional laws.71 Marshall believed that the essence of
judicial power entailed the duty to apply the superior of inconsistent laws.72
If courts were bound to apply statutes without considering their lawfulness,
they would not possess judicial power.
The failure of lawyers, judges, law professors, legislators, and other
government officials to recognize that the will of the people must be
grounded in right and that right originates in “the Laws of Nature and
Nature’s God,” leads to a view that law is simply the product of will.73
Marshall believed that law must be grounded in right. The belief that law is
based solely on acts of the will or commands of the sovereign—be it a
sovereign king, parliament, or people—is legal positivism, which is the
prevailing jurisprudence today in one or another of its many forms. This is
so notwithstanding the horrors of the twentieth century with which this
belief system is associated.74
Just as Marshall began his treatment of judicial review by drawing a
distinction between right and will, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) began his
“Treatise on Law” with a discussion of the relationship between reason and
will.75 The distinction and relationship between right or reason and will was
71. Id. at 178.
72. Id. at 177.
73. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
74. Legal positivism was the legal philosophy of some of the most notorious totalitarian
regimes of the twentieth century. Professor John C.H. Wu explained that law in the Soviet
Union pushed legal positivism to its logical end: “The will of the dominant class becomes
the essence of law, and reason becomes the handmaid of will.” JOHN C.H. WU, THE
FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE: A STUDY IN THE NATURAL LAW 44 (1955).
75. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 205-337 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
1971) (1952).
Thomas Aquinas discussed four categories of law—external, natural, human, and
divine. Id. at 208-11. These correspond to Blackstone’s four categories—law of nature,
natural law, human law, and revealed law. See supra note 13. For present purposes, the main
point of difference between Aquinas and Blackstone is that Blackstone placed a greater
emphasis upon the need for revealed law due to man’s sin nature that affects his powers of
reasoning. See supra note 13. Aquinas is more positive regarding the efficiency of man’s
reason unaided by Scripture to attain the truth. The essential difference between Aquinas and
Blackstone is not the content of the eternal law and the law of nature; it is the relative ability
of man to know the truth without resort to Scripture.
While Aquinas’ distinction between reason and will is parallel to Marshall’s
distinction between right and will and is very useful in dispelling the errors of positivism,
this is not an endorsement of Roman Catholic natural law jurisprudence. That jurisprudence
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central to Aquinas’ view of law. He posed the question: “Whether Law is
Something Pertaining to Reason?”76 His answer was that law pertains
primarily to reason, and that will, exercised contrary to reason, is not law.77
He concluded that the will of the sovereign must be exercised in accord
with reason; otherwise, it would “savour of lawlessness rather than law.”78
Civil law proceeds from the exercise of will in harmony with reason.
Reason and will constituted Marshall’s dual foundation for identifying the
Constitution as law deriving from the people. The American people adopted
the Constitution as an exercise of their original right and will, according to
Marshall in Marbury.79 Professor Wu summarized the proper role of reason
and will in the law:
Of course, both will and reason enter into the making of a law.
Will is not to be despised, because it is given by God to man and
belongs to his spiritual nature. As St. Thomas has said, “All law
proceeds from the reason and the will of the lawgiver; the Divine
and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law
from the will of man, regulated by reason.” In other words, “in
order that the volition of what is commanded may have the
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of
reason.”80
Aquinas’ view of the relationship between will and reason was not
limited to theological and philosophical discussions; it was central to an
understanding of the common law as practiced in England. Lord Bracton
(1210-1268), a contemporary of Aquinas and widely regarded as the
“Father of the Common Law,” incorporated in similar terms the
relationship between reason and will into his treatise De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae.81 Bracton wrote that the “king himself [ought to

is based upon insufficiently Christian views of the Creator-creature distinction, the effect of
sin on human nature, and God’s revelation. See Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Book Review: Robert
George’s The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis, 3 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 77, 89-93 (2009) (reviewing ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW,
RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS (2001)).
76. AQUINAS, supra note 75, at 205.
77. Id. at 205-06.
78. Id. at 206.
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
80. WU, supra note 74, at 74 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 71.
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be] under God, and under the Law, because the Law makes the king. . . .
[T]here is no king where will, and not Law, wields dominion.”82
The law of God not only provides the right of the people to form the type
of government they believe will most effectively secure their other rights,
but it also provides the basic content of those rights government is designed
to secure. The law of God provides the “general principles of law” to which
Marshall appealed and which Part IV of this Article addresses.83 While a
constitution is adopted by the people’s act of political will, which is based
upon a legal right to institute a form of government, the Declaration of
Independence asserts that government is instituted for the purpose of
securing “unalienable rights,” which include “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.” These are rights with which all men are “endowed by their
Creator.”84
Many of these inalienable rights are enumerated in the United States
Constitution, just as they are, in part, enumerated in the Declaration of
Independence. For example, the Fifth Amendment states that no one shall
be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”85 The
Ninth Amendment, on the other hand, states that, “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”86 While the Declaration and Constitution
expressly list some of the preexisting rights the frame of government is
designed to secure, those documents do not offer an exhaustive listing or
exposition of these rights. These inalienable rights are closely linked to the
general principles of law discussed below in Part IV.
Because those constitutional provisions listing or summarizing
inalienable rights and those dealing simply with the framework of
government have different origins, they are of a different nature from each
other and are subject to different methods of interpretation. Controversies
arise regarding proper methods of interpretation, in part, due to the failure
to recognize differences between positive law and the law of nature. A
constitution, as contemplated by Justice Marshall, is comprised both of a
form of government that is instituted by the will of the people as a Godgiven right and of a partial listing or general statement of inalienable

82. Id. at 73 (citing BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, I, at 16
(1915)).
83. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
84. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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rights.87 These rights are preexisting and unchanging. Forms of government
are devised, based on a people’s prudential or political judgments as to
which form will best secure these rights. Prudential or political judgments
must always be made in the context of, and not contrary to, the law of
nature. Provisions of the Constitution that delegate powers reflect the
prudential judgments of the people, and thus the text and original intent
should be the focus of interpretation. Those provisions which are
declarative of preexisting rights, and those fundamental rights and
principles of law that are not expressly identified in the Constitution, are
not interpreted solely or even primarily on the basis of the text or original
intent. A constitution then is a frame of government prudentially adopted
for the purpose of applying a preexisting body of rights and law.
If the right to enact positive law, be it constitutions adopted by the
people or statutes enacted by their agents, is founded upon the law of
nature, certain implications must follow. Marshall asserted that if a statute
conflicts with the Constitution, it is not law, and therefore the courts are not
to apply it.88 The logical implication is that if a provision of a constitution
conflicts with the law of nature, it is not law, and the courts are not to apply
it because it is not law. Just as Congress receives its authority to legislate
from the people and may not exceed the scope of that delegation, the people
receive their right to adopt a constitution from God and may not exceed the
scope of that delegation. The judiciary must interpret and apply lawful acts
of Congress, lawful provisions of the Constitution, and general principles of
law when deciding particular cases.
IV. MARBURY—THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The right to form a Constitution is grounded in preexisting law (original
right), and the Constitution is designed to give effect to preexisting law
(inalienable rights).89 God’s law not only provides the right to establish a

87. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. It was the American practice to include in
colonial, state, and federal constitutions a partial listing of legal rights that all men enjoy as a
gift of their Creator. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 9
(1998).
88. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
89. Because Jesus Christ is Creator, John 1:1-5, and Supreme Ruler, Hebrews 2:6-8, He
is also Supreme Lawgiver, superior to Moses who was the first lawgiver. Hebrews 3.
Although “the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came though Jesus Christ.”
John 1:17. Jesus made it clear that He did not change the law. Matthew 5:17-20; 22:34-40.
But in Him the truth did appear in the flesh, John 1:14, and in His flesh He bore the curse of
the law. Galatians 3:13. The origin of Western rule-of-law jurisprudence is grounded in the
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framework of government, but it also identifies the rights—life liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness—that the framework is designed to secure. God’s
law also provides other general principles of law that all courts possessing
judicial power are to apply in deciding cases. In Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall made clear that the courts are to adjudicate legal claims of
individuals against executive officers based on “acts of congress and the
general principles of law.”90 Marshall asserted that the “very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”91 He wrote further,
quoting Blackstone, “that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that law is invaded.”92
Similarly, Marshall’s references to the judicial power—“province of the
court . . . to decide on the rights of individuals,” “the province and duty . . .
to say what the law is,” and the “very essence of judicial duty”—pointed to
a law of the nature of judicial power.93 He presupposed a preexisting law,
whose source is identified in the Declaration of Independence, that grounds
the right to establish a government, provides the general principles of law,
and defines the nature of judicial power.
Marshall’s “general principles of law” may be identified in part with the
“general principles of commercial law” to which Justice Story appealed in
Swift v. Tyson.94 It is generally recognized that Story’s opinion in Swift was
grounded in law-of-nature jurisprudence.95 Swift held that, in the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction, federal courts were to apply general principles of law
even if those principles were contrary to the holdings of state supreme court
cases.96 The implication is that the exercise of judicial power entails the
application of general principles of law as a court understands them to be,
and that only in matters purely local in nature should a federal court defer to

truth that there is a transcendent lawgiver. The general principles of law derive from the law
of nature, whose author is Jesus Christ.
90. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
91. Id. at 163.
92. Id. (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
93. Id. at 170, 177-78.
94. Id. at 170; Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 18, 22 (1842).
95. The author has used the term “law-of-nature” jurisprudence to distinguish it from
the “natural law” philosophies of the Greco-Roman world, traditional Roman Catholic
jurists, Protestant Arminian theologians, Deists, and even many Reformed Protestants. In
general, those natural law philosophies fail to acknowledge, or at least compromise, the
distinction between the Creator and the creation, and the effect of Adam’s sin on human
nature, especially in regard to man’s ability to reason rightly without Scripture.
96. Swift, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 18-19.
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a state court’s interpretation of law.97 In short, Swift was based on the lawof-nature jurisprudence set out in the Declaration of Independence, that law
is not simply a human convention. This jurisprudence provided the basic
rule of law upon which thousands of decisions in federal diversity cases
were premised until 1938, when the Supreme Court overruled Swift in the
case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.98
Because most contemporary lawyers, judges, and law professors do not
recognize any law superior to the Constitution that is necessary to justify a
people establishing their own form of government, they logically cannot
recognize that such rights as life, liberty, and property have an existence
independent of and preexistent to the will of man. This means they will not
recognize the existence of general principles of law as articulated in
Marbury and Swift, nor will they admit of any law superior to the written
words of a constitution.99
The problem of defining the concept of general principles of law is
intertwined with the problem of defining “common law.” Today, common
law has no generally accepted meaning, though it is often referred to as
judge-made law. This assertion is made despite the fact that Article I of the
97. Id.
98. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
99. Legal positivists are not likely to take James Otis’ argument in the writs of
assistance case as recounted in Page Smith’s biography of John Adams seriously, and
anyone who does take it seriously will likely be dismissed:
Otis’ listeners, according to their predilections, were thrilled or startled to hear
such a daring statement of the case against the writs. Otis had placed what
would, before many years, be called “colonial opposition” on the high ground
of principle rather than on the uncertain footing of precedent. He had boldly
enunciated the view that acts of Parliament which conflicted with the unwritten
and highly nebulous British constitution or, even more broadly, with “natural
equity”—a phrase that might not improperly be translated “fair play”—were of
no effect, and must be so declared by the King’s courts. It was extraordinary,
astonishing and fateful. Adams was stirred in his deepest being, swept by the
speaker’s power from all mooring of skepticism or hesitation, transfixed by
Otis’ masterful use of classical quotation, of common law, of history, and of
Scripture. It is only given a man to be once so moved, so transported as John
Adams was. These are the experiences that touch and transform; these are the
moments in which truth seems to have descended from heaven in the inspired
word. An old man’s hindsight must have its due, for it is indeed in such
moments that men are remade and revolutions conceived. Born from the
authentic word, they grow in the darkness of men’s hearts and minds until they
are ready to dispute with the powers of this world the issue of man’s destiny on
earth.
1 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 56 (1962).

2010]

FOUNDATION OF LAW

317

U.S. Constitution and probably all state constitutions vest the power to
make law in a legislative body separate from the courts.100 The judge-made
view of law, unless it recognizes a preexisting law, is a form of legal
positivism—that law is simply the command of the sovereign. At other
times, the common law is described as an accumulation of social customs
that courts take note of and expressly articulate as holdings in the context of
particular cases. This view reflects a more sociological jurisprudence and
obviates the problem of courts making law.101 Under a sociological view,
courts may be viewed as simply discovering, interpreting, and applying
law. But unless the common law is something more than social custom as
mediated by the courts, it too is simply another form of legal positivism.
Moreover, the courts seldom limit their role to mediating the public
consensus and instead attempt to formulate a new consensus.102
It is generally accepted, based at least in part on his opinion in Swift v.
Tyson, that Justice Story viewed the common law very differently.103
Justice Story expressly stated that court opinions are not law, though they
may provide evidence of what the law is.104 This would hold true, it seems,
100. U.S. CONST. art. I. That such assertions are routinely made and go unchallenged
provides tribute to Erie’s mind-numbing effect.
101. According to the founder of American sociological jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound
(1870-1964), the law is “a social institution [designed] to satisfy social wants.”
BODENHEIMER, supra note 38, at 118 (citing ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (1954)). Oliver Wendell Holmes communicated a sociological
jurisprudential perspective when he stated:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed.
Id. at 122 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923)).
102. According to Professor Lino A. Graglia, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 397 (1954), marked the end of the Court’s role as “a defender
of the status quo and a brake on social change,” which it first adopted in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and the start of its current role as “the nation’s primary
initiator and accelerator of social change.” Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law Without the
Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Remaking of America, in A COUNTRY I DO NOT
RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES 1, 24-25, 27 (Robert H. Bork ed.,
2005).
103. It is safe to assume that what Justice Story believed about general commercial law
and its relation to the law of nature holds true for the common law as a whole. Certainly that
is the understanding that the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie and York derived from Swift.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
104. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
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for federal court opinions as well as for state court opinions. In Swift,
Justice Story cited opinions from multiple jurisdictions and different
periods in history, not as evidence of some broader social custom, but as
evidence of what the law of God is on a particular matter of commercial
law.105 The Swift opinion embodies the view that law is “permanent,
uniform and universal.”106 It does not change; it applies to everyone
equally; and it applies in every part of the world. This was Blackstone’s
view of the common law, and it was also Lord Coke’s view of the common
law. Coke’s Institutes of the Lawes of England and Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England were the primary texts used in
training American lawyers for over 200 years.107 Neither Blackstone nor

105. Swift, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1.
106. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44. In addressing questions of general
commercial law, such as the construction of contracts, Story explained that the Supreme
Court and State courts have a similar function: “to ascertain, upon general reasoning and
legal analogies . . . what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to
govern the case.” Swift, 41 U.S. at 19. The decisions of local tribunals on the subject do not
constitute law, but “only evidence of what the laws are.” Id. at 18. Story pointed to the law
that governs general questions of commercial law by invoking Cicero’s statement, “Non erit
alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni
tempore una eademque lex obtinebit.” Id. at 19 (quoting Cicero as adopted by Lord
Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887). The permanent, uniform, and universal nature
of the law to which Story alluded in Swift is better understood when the words which Story
attributed to Cicero are read in the context of Cicero’s entire statement:
[L]aw in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature. It is spread
through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal, calling people
to their duty by its commands and deterring them from wrong-doing by its
prohibitions. When it addresses a good man, its commands and prohibitions are
never in vain; but those same commands and prohibitions have no effect on the
wicked. This law cannot be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended,
nor can it be totally rescinded. We cannot be exempted from this law by any
decree of the Senate or the people; nor do we need anyone else to expound or
explain it. There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one
now and another in the future, but all peoples at all time will be embraced by a
single and eternal and unchangeable law; and there will be, as it were, one lord
and master of us all—the [G]od who is the author, proposer, and interpreter of
that law.
Cicero, The Republic, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 68-69 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998)
(emphasis added).
107. Alan F. Day, Lawyers in Colonial Maryland, 1660-1715, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
145, 153-57 (1973); Clement Eaton, A Mirror of the Southern Colonial Lawyer: The Fee
Books of Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and Waightstill Avery, 8 WM. & MARY Q. (3D
SER.) 520, 520-34 (1951); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American
Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 759-67 (1976); see also
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Coke were judicial or sociological positivists. Professor Wu provides the
following summary of Coke’s view of the common law:
In Calvin’s Case, [Coke] declared that “the law of nature is part
of the law of England,” . . . and that “the law of nature is
immutable.” He identified the law of nature with the eternal law.
He said, “The law of nature is that which God at the time of
creation of the nature of man infused into his heart, for his
preservation and direction; and this is lex aeterna, the moral law,
called also the law of nature. And by this law, written by the
finger of God in the heart of man, were the people of God a long
time governed, before the law was written by Moses, who was
the first reporter or writer of the law in the world.” Again, in Dr.
Bonham’s Case, [Coke] laid down the principle of judicial
review: “And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to
be performed, the common law will controul it, and judge such
an Act to be void.”108
Justice Story had written similarly that “[t]here never has been a period in
which the common law did not recognize Christianity as lying at its
foundations.”109
Swift dealt specifically with a question of commercial law in a diversity
case where the parties were citizens of two different states.110 Hopes for
resolving problems related to interstate commerce were a major impetus for
adopting the Constitution of the United States. In Europe and England,
there had long been commercial or mercantile courts distinct from other

READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Dennis R. Nolan ed.,
1980).
108. WU, supra note 74, at 91.
109. Joseph Story, Address Discourse Pronounced upon the Inauguration of the Author,
as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25th, 1829, in THE LEGAL MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 178 (Perry Miller ed., Cornell University
Press 1969) (1962) (“One of the beautiful boasts of our [United States] municipal
jurisprudence is, that Christianity is part of the Common Law, from which it seeks the
sanction of its rights, and by which it endeavors to regulate its doctrines . . . . There never
has been a period in which the common law did not recognize Christianity as lying at its
foundations.”).
110. Swift, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1.

320

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:297

courts.111 Those courts applied a commercial law common to all peoples—
“lex mercatoria”—that was especially responsive to the need to resolve
conflicts arising amongst members of the commercial class engaged in
international trade.112 The parties needed judges with an expertise in
commercial matters; they needed uniformity; and they needed responsive
procedures.113
Certainly the Framers had similar concerns related to the commercial life
of the Republic in mind when they drafted the various diversity clauses in
Article III of the Constitution.114 Section 2 of Article III contains a series of
clauses addressing the sorts of problems that are common to international
law.115 The Article III “diversity clause” and section 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 were certainly designed, at least in part, with a view
to providing a satisfactory resolution to the kinds of problems that
frequently arise with international commercial relations.116
The standards of commercial law cannot simply be imposed by any one
nation if it hopes to participate in and benefit from free international trade.
There must be mutually recognized legal standards. Those general
standards are reflected particularly in a shared Christian culture.117 The
efficacy of the right common moral basis, and therefore legal basis, upon
which it is possible to conduct interstate commerce is reflected in the
Article IV “Full Faith and Credit” clause of the U.S. Constitution.118
Because the several American states shared a common law, in Coke’s sense
of the term, they could be confident that few problems would arise in giving
effect to the laws and other acts of sister states. God has established an
111. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 346 (1983).
112. Id. at 348.
113. Id. at 346-48.
114. U.S. CONST. art. III.
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 1 Stat. 73.
117. One might ask whether we can have rule of law if most people do not recognize
basic standards of right and wrong. The answer is “No, unless people act according to
Christian principles despite their own professed lack of Christian beliefs.” For example, it is
no coincidence that the concept of the rule of law over the state and the earliest secular legal
systems, including feudal, manorial, mercantile, urban, and royal, have their origin in the
Papal Revolution, a time when Christianity was the faith of the West. See BERMAN, supra
note 111, at 273-75, 292-94. Specifically, mercantile law developed only after the
emergence of a “Christian social theory” that viewed economic activities as “a path to
salvation, if carried on according to the principles laid down by the church,” i.e., “a system
of law based on the will of God as manifested in reason and conscience.” Id. at 339.
118. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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international regime of multiple nation-states with limited territorial
jurisdiction that are mutually dependent upon one another.119 If they are to
interact, they must have a common basis for law. To have a common legal
basis, they must have a common Lawgiver.120 In a world of multiple
jurisdictions in which no one political entity can impose unity by an act of
will, unity comes only through common submission to right that precedes
and gives direction to will.121
This raises a difficult question, a question that is separate from, but
related to, the question of whether the general common law is to be
identified with God’s law.122 Assuming for the moment that Swift is right,
and there is a body of general common law that federal courts are bound to
apply, what language in the Constitution can be identified as recognizing
this law as the rule of decision in particular cases?123 This same question
must be asked of section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.124 Section
34, as quoted in Swift, provided: “[T]he laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision, in trials
at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”125
Swift held that the phrase “laws of the several states” does not include
state judicial decisions regarding general commercial law, but rather “local
statute or positive, fixed or ancient local usage.”126 Section 34 says nothing
about general principles of law, common law, or commercial law providing
rules of decision. The Constitution likewise appears to be silent regarding
119. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 32:8; Isaiah 60; 1 Kings 5; 1 Kings 10; see also infra note
121.
120. “There is only one Lawgiver and Judge, the one who is able to save and destroy.”
James 4:12.
121. In Paul’s speech to the Greeks, he stated:
From one man he made every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole
earth; and he determined the times set for them and the exact places where they
should live. God did this so that men would seek him and perhaps reach out for
him and find him, though he is not far from each of us.
Acts 17:26-27.
122. Even if one embraces Erie and rejects Swift, these questions cannot be avoided,
because under Erie states must look to something to determine what the general common
law is, and federal courts must look to something to determine what the federal common law
is.
123. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 1 Stat. 73).
126. Id.
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general principles of law as binding the courts of the United States.127 This
same issue arises with regard to customary international law. What
language in the Constitution provides authority to apply customary
international law in U.S. courts? Article VI states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
States to the contrary notwithstanding.128
General principles of law and customary international law are not made
pursuant to the Constitution. They exist independently of the existence of
the United States. The power to apply general principles of law and
customary international law derives from Article III, Section 1, “The
judicial Power of the United States.”129 Any court, anywhere, at any time,
that is given “judicial power,” has by its very nature the power and duty to
apply “general principles of law.” An ostensible grant of judicial power that
does not confer that power would not truly be a grant of judicial power.
Certain territorial, subject matter, and other limitations may be placed on
particular courts, but when they are granted judicial power, they may never
be required to apply any rule contrary to the “general principles of law.”
This is consistent with Marshall’s view of the power of judicial review. It is
not a power separate from that of deciding cases and controversies.130
Essential components of judicial power include, first, determining which of
two conflicting rules is superior, and second, interpreting and applying the
general principles of law where applicable.131

127. Even if one agrees with Erie that there is no general common law, one is faced with
the same problem when trying to discern the “federal common law” of admiralty, copyright,
or international law. The federal common law frequently deals with “state law matters” of
negligence, contract, property, and even commercial paper. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 353 (2003).
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Arguably, general principles of law and customary
international law fall under the phrase in Article III, “this Constitution, [and] the laws of the
United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It would seem that “laws of the United
States” as it appears in Article III, Section 2, clause 1 means the same thing as it does in
Article VI, clause 2, where it is specifically qualified by the phrase “which shall be made in
pursuance [of the Constitution].” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
130. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
131. Id.
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Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison and Story’s opinion in Swift
v. Tyson recognize the existence of general principles of law in addition to
the original right to establish constitutions. Those principles of the law of
nature include the necessity to provide remedies for legal wrongs, standards
of conduct for government officers, and obligations of individuals who
engage in commercial transactions. Marshall in Marbury, just as Story in
Swift, treated both the acts of Congress and general principles of law as
applicable in the federal courts.132
Marshall and Story’s view of the law prevailed in federal diversity cases
until 1938, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.133 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in Erie,
overruled Swift and held that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”134
Henceforth, the “laws of the several states” that federal courts were to apply
in diversity cases included the decisions of state courts interpreting
common law.135 The federal courts were no longer to apply general
principles of law because “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power upon the federal courts.”136 Brandeis made it clear not only
that he believed courts had no constitutional warrant to apply general
principles of law, but also that he believed there was no such law: “The
fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr.
Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is ‘a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it . . . .’”137
Brandeis concluded that courts make law and that there is no law for the
courts to apply except that which the state courts or legislatures make:
“‘The authority and only authority is the State, and, if that be so, the voice
adopted by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court) should utter the last word.’”138 The Supreme Court in Erie,
and soon thereafter in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, went out of its way to
make it clear that the primary problem with Swift was not faulty statutory
construction, or even faulty constitutional interpretation.139 The problem
was even more fundamental than Swift’s failure to recognize that courts
132. Id. at 173; Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
133. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
134. Id. at 78.
135. Id. at 78-79; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 1 Stat. 73.
136. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
137. Id. at 79 (quoting Swift, 41 U.S. (1 Pet) 1).
138. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
139. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
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make law. The Supreme Court in Erie broke not merely with Swift, but with
a legal tradition dating back at least to Bracton.140 It made a radical
declaration that law does not pertain primarily to reason, but rather to will.
Erie marked the culmination of a shift from an order of civil law based on
right or reason and will to an order that is the product solely of the human
will.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court seven years later in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, proclaimed that Erie had not only overruled a longestablished precedent, but that it had actually established an entirely
different way of looking at the law.141 Frankfurter, following Brandeis’
lead, also quoted Holmes, but this time depicted natural law jurisprudence
in pejorative terms as a “brooding omnipresence.”142 And, perhaps in
reference to Thomas Aquinas, Blackstone, and others, he wrote that law
was no longer seen as based on “Reason.”143 Frankfurter wrote:
In overruling Swift v. Tyson, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins did not
merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of
looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its
inadequacies had been laid bare. Law was conceived as a
‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions were
merely evidence and not themselves the controlling
formulations.144
From at least the thirteenth century, the foundational principle of Christian
common law jurisprudence was that human will must be exercised in
accord with right or reason to be law. Erie changed that. The Court rejected
Bracton, who had written that the “king himself [ought to be] under God,

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
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and under law, because the law makes the king . . . .”145 Thus, in American
jurisprudence, Erie marked the “Triumph of the Will.”146
V. MARBURY—THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL POWERS
The distinction and relationship between original right and original will
was foundational to Marshall’s conclusion that the Constitution is
paramount law and that the courts have the duty to apply that law in cases
before them.147 In addressing the power of courts to review the legality of
acts of the executive branch, Marshall drew a distinction between
obligatory and discretionary acts. This is closely related to the distinctions
he drew between right and will, and between judicial and political.148 He
wrote that certain acts of the President that may be deemed discretionary
are by nature political and are therefore not subject to judicial review.149
However, when Congress by proper enactment places particular obligations
on the President, these become legal duties that courts have the power to
interpret and enforce.150 In other words, an exercise of executive will that is
contrary to right or law is subject to judicial review because the act is no

145. See WU, supra note 82, at 73 (citing Bracton). Ironically, Justice Robert Jackson
who joined the Court’s opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York was to become the chief U.S
prosecutor at Nuremberg. In his widely acclaimed opening statement before the International
Military Tribunal, Justice Jackson appealed to “brooding omnipresence” jurisprudence. Not
only did he invoke the Declaration of Independence in referring to the “natural and
inalienable rights in every human being,” but he also submitted that “even rulers are, as Lord
Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, ‘under God and the law.’” 2 INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1948).
146. “Triumph of the Will” is the name of a much-heralded Nazi propaganda film
produced by Leni Riefenstahl. TRIUMPH OF THE WILL (Universum Film AG 1935). “Why We
Fight,” a film produced by Frank Capra, was America’s response to “Triumph of the Will.”
WHY WE FIGHT (U.S. Army Pictorial Services 1942). Every United States Marine knows
why we fight: “First to fight for right.” MARINES’ HYMN (U.S. Marine Corps 1929). The
“American fabric” is that even war, which entails the imposition of will by the most extreme
means of force in the most perilous of situations, must be grounded in right and must be
prosecuted rightly. It was on the proper relationship between right and will that the nation
was founded and its Constitution adopted, and it is only by maintaining the proper
relationship between right and will that it will be preserved.
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
148. Id. at 165-66, 176.
149. Id. at 166.
150. Id.
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longer discretionary or political in nature but rather is obligatory.151
Madison had an obligation to deliver the commission.152
The people, in the exercise of their original right, delegated the judicial
power to a branch of government separate from the legislative and
executive branches. In order to exercise this power properly, the courts
must define the nature or essence of the judicial power and distinguish it
from the political powers. The Constitution itself does not define any of the
three powers. Just as Marshall presupposed the nature of a constitution, he
also presupposed the natures of the judicial and political powers.153 He
made no appeal to original intent, engaged in no textual exposition, cited no
case precedent, divined no social consensus, and conducted no utilitarian
analysis. Likewise, the people, as an exercise of prudence, allocated the
judicial and political powers to separate branches of government, but in so
doing simply treated the definition of those powers as a given. They
presupposed a distinction that derives from the law of God and that is
modeled in His way of ruling the world—He rules as both Judge and
Governor.154
Because Madison chose not to answer Marbury’s complaint or the
Court’s show cause order, Marshall was forced to speculate as to defenses
Madison might have raised had he appeared in court.155 Marshall assumed
Madison would argue that the decision not to deliver the commission was
political in nature and therefore was not subject to judicial review.156 This
defense might have taken one of two forms. One form would be to argue
that the power of appointment is purely political by its very nature and is
therefore a matter left solely to the President’s discretion. Even if the
decision to deliver the commission was not political in nature, a second
form of defense would have been that the status of the executive department
151. Id.
152. Id. at 168.
153. Id. at 177. Marshall presumed that: “Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void.” Id.
154. The distinction and relationship between law and policy shows up repeatedly,
though sometimes in different guises, throughout Constitutional law. An understanding of
that distinction and relationship is necessary for understanding Marshall’s opinion, and
Marbury presents an excellent opportunity to lay the foundation for subsequent cases. Psalm
9:7-8 describes God ruling as judge and governor: “The Lord reigns forever; he has
established his throne for judgment. He will judge the world in righteousness; he will govern
the peoples with justice.”
155. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154.
156. Id. at 164.
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as a separate branch of government made it immune to judicial process.
Madison would likely bolster this defense by claiming that it would be
improper for the Court to inquire into the “intimate political relation” of the
President and department heads and that it would constitute an
intermeddling “with the prerogatives of the executive.”157 Marshall
conceded the principle that if delivery were by nature a matter of discretion,
the court would have no power to review it, but he denied that Madison had
the discretion not to deliver it under the applicable facts and law.158
Marshall also denied that the “peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate”
nature of inter-branch relations made it a decision over which the Court had
no power of review.159 Marshall acknowledged that, “Questions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court.”160 But Marshall denied that
either of these limitations on the exercise of the judicial power was
applicable in Marbury’s case.161
Congress has the right to establish various departments of government
that it believes are necessary for achieving constitutional objectives. For
example, Congress created the Department of State and the Office of
Secretary of State with the duty to act at the direction of the President.162
Official acts within the scope of the statutory grant of authority and not
circumscribed by particular statutory obligations or prohibitions are
discretionary in nature.163 Likewise, the President’s appointment of persons
to hold various offices is a matter of discretion.164 Also, the President’s

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 165, 169.
Id. at 170. The context of Marshall’s statement is as follows:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.
Id.; see also id. at 165-66.
161. Political and executive restraints on the Supreme Court’s judicial power would have
applied in Marbury had the delivery of Marbury’s commission depended on the exercise of
“executive discretion,” rather than performance of a legal duty under an act of congress and
the “general principles of law.” Id. at 170.
162. 1 Stat. 28 (1789); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 139.
163. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166, 170.
164. Id. at 166.
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power to remove an officer who holds an at-will appointment is
discretionary in nature.165
President Adams’ decision to appoint Marbury as a justice of the peace
was discretionary in nature and not subject to judicial review.166 The law
may not direct the appointment of any particular person.167 However,
because the office was for a fixed term of five years, the decision to remove
from office or withhold the commission was no longer discretionary once
the appointment was perfected.168 When Congress imposes specific duties
on an officer and directs him by law to perform those duties, they are a
matter of obligation, and when rights of individuals depend on the
performance of those obligations, the courts must order officers to perform
their duties.169 Madison, as Secretary of State, had a legal duty to deliver
the commission to Marbury, and failure to do so injured Marbury, entitling
him to an appropriate remedy.170 No longer were the President’s actions
ones that were only politically examinable by an appeal to the ballot box or
conscience; they were judicially examinable in a court of law.171
An analysis of the distinction between judicial and legislative powers is
often focused on differences in two elements—one is the element of time,
and the other the element of applicability. The distinction based on the
element of time is described in an oft-quoted passage from Justice Holmes:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the
other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions
by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part
of those subject to its power.172
Professor Dickinson placed emphasis on the second element, that of
applicability: “What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the
former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied
165. Id. at 172.
166. Id. at 165-67.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 167-68.
169. Id. at 166.
170. Id. at 166, 168.
171. Id. In the cases of justices of the peace, Congress had circumscribed the power of
removal by creating a right upon appointment to a five-year term of office. Id. at 155.
Marbury’s appointment was perfected when President Adams signed the commission and
the Secretary of State affixed the seal of the United States. Id. at 158-59. Marbury thus had a
right to possession of the commission and Madison an obligation to deliver it. Id. at 163.
172. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
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in a further proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual
will be definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon
individuals in their individual capacity.”173
The action of legislating, which includes the adoption of a constitution,
is forward-looking or prospective in nature. The focus in the legislative
process is not upon determining what happened at some particular time in
the past in some discrete situation. The focus is on formulating rules best
designed to achieve some lawful object of government. The process of
legislation may entail codifying preexisting law, be it inalienable rights or
general principles of law, but its distinguishing characteristic is that it
designs positive enactments to best achieve legitimate government
objectives. The second characteristic that distinguishes the legislative from
the judicial process is that legislation is framed in general terms regulating
all persons similarly situated.
The process of adjudication, on the other hand, has a focus that is
backward-looking in nature. Adjudication is designed to determine what
happened to a relatively limited number of persons at some discrete time in
the past. A court applies already existing law, be it acts of Congress,
general principles of law, or the Constitution, to the facts of a case in order
to determine whether a legal duty has been breached. If it has been, the
court applies a remedy focused on restoring the victim, not achieving some
future objective. Adjudication applies with particularity to a limited number
of persons who are parties to a lawsuit.
The exercise of the executive power, which like the exercise of the
legislative power is forward-looking in nature, is designed to best achieve
the legislative objects. The executive and legislative powers, as well as the
power of appointment, are political or prudential in nature. In addition to
being forward-looking in nature, the political powers have in common the
fact that they emphasize the imposition of will, though always
circumscribed by law. Alexander Hamilton made the following distinction
between the political and judicial branches:
[I]n a government in which [the different departments of power]
are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of
its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution . . . . The judiciary . . . has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
173. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
UNITED STATES 21 (Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (1927).
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resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL, but merely judgment . . . .174
Congress, in exercising the legislative power, makes judgments as to the
best means of achieving constitutional objectives or ends. The President
makes his best judgment in allocating resources and applying force to
achieve those ends. The necessity and expediency of those political
judgments are not subject to judicial review. The judicial power does not
entail the exercise of will (courts do not make law; the law already exists),
and it does not entail the use of force (courts do not execute their own
judgments; they depend upon the executive branch). Courts exercise only
judgment—not political judgment that is forward-looking, but judicial
judgment that is backward-looking in nature.
Marshall articulated his view of the legislative power more fully in
McCulloch v. Maryland.175 He asserted that the key to interpreting
Congress’s constitutional powers (the Constitution itself being legislation of
the people) is to contemplate the objective of a given enumerated power.176
Congress, in turn, must design legislative acts to accord with enumerated
constitutional objectives. The necessary legislative means are those which
are “convenient, or useful, or essential,” “most beneficial to the people,”
and “really calculated to effect” those constitutional objects.177 The
President has the power of implementing measures, if need be by force, to
achieve those legislative objectives.
In Marbury, Marshall devoted considerable attention to describing the
nature of the judicial power. A judge has no political power, as the
“province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals . . . .”178 A judge, in deciding the rights of individuals, must
“apply the rule to particular cases.”179 In order to apply the law, a judge
must “expound and interpret that rule” which is applicable to the case at
hand.180 Marshall’s statement, “It is emphatically the province and duty of
174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
175. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
176. Id. at 411. The Preamble to the Constitution states in general terms the ends that it is
designed to achieve. It also makes clear that we the People have established a frame of
government not only for ourselves but also for “our Posterity.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. The
enumerated powers are themselves to be defined in terms of their ends or objects; there is a
future orientation and general applicability to the body politic. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 411.
177. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 420, 423.
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
179. Id. at 177.
180. Id.
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the judicial department to say what the law is,”181 is often quoted out of
context to promote the idea of judicial supremacy. But Marshall goes on to
say, “Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”182 The judicial power is limited to
particular cases; it may not be employed to make law.183
A necessary incident of judicial judgment also includes the power to
pronounce a proper remedy.184 In fact, Marshall claimed that “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”185
In the particular case of Marbury, the essential facts were that President
Adams, following the advice and consent of the Senate, signed a
commission thereby appointing Marbury, and the Secretary of State affixed
the seal of the United States to that commission.186 It was not for the Court
to decide whether the creation of the office of justice of the peace was the
best means of governing the District of Columbia or whether any particular
person was best qualified to hold that office.187 Those were political
decisions, one delegated to Congress (creation of the office) and the other
to the President (appointment of Marbury).188
Just as the doctrines of judicial review and general principles of law are
grounded in the jurisprudence of the Declaration of Independence, so also is
the doctrine distinguishing between the judicial and political powers. Civil
officers exercise those powers in a manner that is reflective and imitative of
the manner in which God governs the affairs of men and nations—as

181. Id. Marshall states:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to
the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 177-78.
182. Id. at 177.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 163 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109.)
185. Id.
186. Id. at 155.
187. Id. at 166, 170.
188. Id. at 164, 166.
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“Supreme Judge of the World”189 and as “Divine Providence.”190 The
exercise of judicial power as an application of established law to past
189. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). Thomas Jefferson had
not included the phrase “appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions” in his original draft of the Declaration. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 241 (1997). The final inclusion of the title of
God as “Supreme Judge of the world” makes it clear that those who adopted the Declaration,
as agents of the people of the thirteen colonies, were not appealing to a detached and
impersonal God of Deism or of the French Enlightenment. There is ample evidence that
biblical Christianity was a far more powerful ideological force among the people and their
agents than faddish European heresies of the day. Donald Lutz compares the relative
influence of the Bible and Enlightenment writers in late and early colonial history:
The relative influence of European thinkers on American political thought is a
large and complex question not to be answered in any but a provisional way
here. We can, however, identify the broad trends of influence and which
European thinkers need to be especially considered. One means to this end is
an examination of the citations in public political literature written between
1760 and 1805. If we ask which book was most frequently cited in that
literature, the answer is, the Bible. . . . [B]iblical tradition accounted for
roughly one-third of the citations in the sample. However, the sample includes
about one-third of all significant secular publications, but only about one-tenth
of the reprinted sermons. Even with this undercount, Saint Paul is cited about
as frequently as Montesquieu and Blackstone, the two most-cited secular
authors, and Deuteronomy is cited almost twice as often as all of Locke’s
writings put together. A strictly proportional sample with respect to secular and
religious sources would have resulted in an abundance of religious references.
LUTZ, supra note 87, at 140. That being the case, it is most likely that many, if not most, of
the signers recognized Christ not only as Creator and Lawgiver, but also as Supreme Judge
before whom all men will one day appear:
Then I saw a great white throne and him who was seated on it. Earth and sky
fled from his presence, and there was no place for them. And I saw the dead,
great and small, standing before the throne, and books were opened. Another
book was opened, which is the book of life. The dead were judged according to
what they had done as recorded in the books. The sea gave up the dead that
were in it, and death and Hades gave up the dead that were in them, and each
person was judged according to what he had done.
Revelation 20:11-13. The nature of judicial power is not only exemplified in Christ’s session
as the Supreme Judge of the world, but it is also supremely demonstrated in his sacrificial
atoning death upon the cross (Romans 3:25-26), which was a judicial judgment upon men’s
sins and a substitutionary punishment (Isaiah 53:5) and payment (1 Peter 1:18-19) for those
sins in satisfaction of the demands of the law. In Christ, God has judged sins committed
beforehand—our actions and even “the rectitude of our intentions”—that we might be spared
the just remedy—condemnation (Romans 8:1-4). (The phrase “the rectitude of our
intentions” comes from THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776)). By that
same law, God judges even “between the nations.” Isaiah 2:1-6.
190. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). Nor did Jefferson
include the phrase “with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence” in his draft.
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conduct is demonstrated through the operation of the office of Supreme
Judge of the World. In fact, the Declaration comprises the essential
elements of a legal complaint—a statement of the judge’s jurisdiction to
hear the case (“Supreme Judge” with universal jurisdiction), a cause of
action (“long train of abuses” that violated “unalienable rights”), and a
remedy (independence/separation from England).191
God also directs and governs, by His will and His law, that which He has
created. The reference to God as “Divine Providence” describes Him in that
office as the One who sees the end from the beginning and governs all
things toward their appointed ends.192 The signers of the Declaration of
Independence, convinced of the rightness of their cause and bound to one
another by oath, moved forward with a firm reliance on God’s protection.193
The nature of political powers as forward-looking and directed to
enumerated ends is demonstrated through the operation of the office of
Divine Providence.
The Declaration of Independence was also in effect a declaration of war.
Though the signers did not want war, they knew that it would follow as a
result of their actions. The Declaration bears the imprint of just war
doctrine that had been refined by theologians and jurists over a period of
many centuries.194 War is not primarily a political instrument used for
promoting national interest; it is a judicial instrument. James Kent wrote
that it is a special kind of lawsuit: “War . . . is one of the highest trials of

MAIER, supra note 189, at 241. It was added later. Id. Given the historical context of the
Declaration, dangers that its signers faced, and solemnity of the accompanying mutual
“pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and sacred honor,” it is clear that the signers
did not think of God as disinterested or detached. They likely believed that it is God “who
works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will.” Ephesians 1:11. In fact, it
is Christ the Creator and Judge in whom “all things hold together” as Divine Providence.
Colossians 1:17.
191. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2, 32 (U.S. 1776).
192. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
193. Id. The signers were men of faith and action, clearly operating on the truth reflected
in several confessions of the day—although “God from all eternity did . . . freely and
unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass,” He offers no violence “to the will of the
creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather
established.” WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH Ch. III.I (Free Presbyterian Publications
1990) (1646).
194. The founders were well-versed in international law as expounded by Vattel and
Grotius. Just war doctrine is a combination of legal and prudential elements. Jeffrey C.
Tuomala, Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 1, 47-59 (1994).
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right; for as princes and states acknowledge no superior upon earth, they
put themselves upon the justice of God, by an appeal to arms.”195
Just war doctrine is comprised of both legal and prudential elements, and
both elements are reflected in the Declaration. The decision to go to war
requires that a lawfully constituted authority make a judgment that there is
just cause in that international law has been broken. That authority must
then determine what use of force is proportionate to the wrong.196 The
Declaration of Independence maintained that each of these legal elements
had been satisfied. It asserted that the American “people [had the right] to
dissolve the political bands which ha[d] connected them with another”
people, as they had been subjected to “a long train of abuses and
usurpations” which were designed to “reduce them under absolute
Despotism.”197
Just war doctrine is also comprised of a number of prudential elements,
including exhaustion of peaceful means of redressing grievances, right
intentions, reasonable hope of success, and hope of peace and reconciliation
with one’s enemies.198 The Declaration states that the people “[i]n every
stage of . . . [o]ppressions . . . [p]etitioned for Redress in the most humble
terms” in order to resolve matters peacefully, invited God to judge “the
rectitude of [their] intentions,” placed their hope for success in the
“protection of divine Providence” and their mutual “pledge,” and expressed
their hope that with England they would be “in Peace friends.”199
The distinction between judicial and political power, whether addressing
domestic or international issues, is basic to Marshall’s opinion in Marbury
and to the Declaration of Independence, which best embodies the
“American fabric” of which Marshall wrote. The nature of those powers is
rooted in the character of God and the manner in which He rules the affairs
of men and nations.

195. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 26 (William Hardcastle Browne
ed., 1894).
196. The three legal elements of just war are right authority, just cause, and
proportionality. Tuomala, supra note 194, at 51-58.
197. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776).
198. Tuomala, supra note 194, at 58-59.
199. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 30-32 (U.S. 1776). The signers seemed
mindful of the truth found in the Magnificat that is both promise and warning: “He has
performed mighty deeds with his arm; he has scattered those who are proud in their inmost
thoughts. He has brought down rulers from their thrones but has lifted up the humble.” Luke
1:51-52; see also Job 12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Marshall based the doctrine of judicial review upon the belief that the
American people had by an act of original will exercised their original right
to adopt the Constitution as paramount positive law.200 The Declaration of
Independence identifies the source of the people’s right to establish a
sovereign and independent nation-state and framework for governing
themselves. That right is derived from the laws of nature, of which God is
the Author.201 Those laws of God not only provide the original right to
establish civil government, but they also grant certain inalienable rights,
including the rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.202 The first
order of government is to secure these rights. Two other fundamentals
given less prominence in Marbury are the general principles of law and the
nature of the judicial and political powers. These too are grounded in the
jurisprudence of the Declaration.
The Declaration of Independence is a legal document, not simply a
statement of political aspirations. It served as the articles of incorporation of
the United States of America; it served as a bill of complaint in a lawsuit
prosecuted by war; and it contains a philosophy of law in which God, the
Author of law and rights, is acknowledged as Lawgiver, Creator, Judge, and
Divine Providence.203 It should come as no surprise that so many lawyers,
judges, and law professors wish to divorce the Constitution and Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison from the Declaration of
Independence, for it is the legal document of a people whose legal
profession believed in the triumph of right—not triumph of the will.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
These four offices find their fullest manifestation in Jesus Christ: Creator (see THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 84), Lawgiver (see THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 56), Judge (see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note
189), and Divine Providence (see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 190).

